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Nov., 1952
objectionable parts of the instructions may have influ-
enced the jury to compromise their verdict 'rests upon
conjecture, merely, and cannot be entertained. We must
assume that the jury performed their duty intelligently,
and with a correct understanding of the charge of the
court.'
In reading the case we find that at one point the Court does com-
ment that a verdict of murder in the first degree would have been
fully supported by the record so that there apparently were ele-
ments to justify the first degree murder charge, where the Tate
case did not have the elements to justify such a charge.
From the reading of these cases together, it would appear that
we now have a new and modified rule. If all the elements are pres-
ent in the case justifying a first degree murder charge, regardless
of the fact that there may be an error in the first degree instruc-
tions and a second degree murder verdict results, such error is
harmless. On the other hand, if any elements of the first degree mur-
der charge are lacking such instruction would be reversible error.
In McBride v. People, the Supreme Court extended the facts
of confidence game as basically shown in Munsell v. People,13 to
cover a series of checks given by the defendant wherein he knows
that the checks are short and held that it was a part of a scheme
to defraud, thus making the checks bogus, and coming within the
confidence game statute. The Court held further that the intent of
the defendant rather than the means used in obtaining the money is
the primary issue of the offense.
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EQUITY
Rand v. Anderson:' The plaintiff, mother of the defendant,
filed the action to rescind an alleged oral agreement whereby he had
agreed to support and maintain her for the remainder of her life,
and to set aside a deed of conveyance in joint tenancy to her son
and herself. The defendant, among other defenses, denied the ex-
istence of the alleged oral agreement and alleged the execution of
conveyance in joint tenancy to have been a voluntary gift on the
part of the plaintiff and the expenditure of large sums by him in
improving the property, and prayed for partition of the premises,
or, in the alternative, if decree of rescission be granted, then that
plaintiff be required to reimburse him for the monies he advanced
and disbursed in reliance on his interest according to the deed.
The lower court found generally for the plaintiff, however, it en-
tered judgment for the defendant against the plaintiff for the
monies paid out by him for improving the property less an amount
charged against him for use and occupancy of a room occupied by
him and his wife until the time they had removed from the prop-
" 122 Colo. 420, 222 P. 2d 615 (1950).
11951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (Jan. 28, 1952).
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erty on account of a disagreement between plaintiff and defendant,
and gave the defendant a lien against the property for his judg-
ment but ordered that defendant could take no steps to recover on
it during the lifetime of the plaintiff.
The Supreme Court did not view either the pleadings or the
evidence in the light of the trial Court and reversed the trial Court,
holding, among other things: that plaintiff had burden of establish-
ing the contract by definite and clear evidence, and, further, that
when evidence relied upon is adduced for the purpose of cancella-
tion of an instrument (in this case the deed in joint tenancy) it
must be beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plaintiff's evi-
dence did not meet the test; and that any judgment for defendant
should have been one open to the present benefit of the defendant
without the above mentioned restrictions for its collection placed
thereon. The Supreme Court in reversing the trial Court, directed
the trial Court to dismiss plaintiff's complaint and vacate defend-
ant's judgment, all without prejudice to the parties starting a new
action.
On September 22, 1952, on rehearing, 2 the Supreme Court
ordered that the opinion heretofore announced and above stated
be withdrawn, the judgment reversed, and the cause remanded with
directions for a new trial. The opinion on such rehearing continued
the Court's position that the plaintiff had to establish her allegea
agreement or contract, as well as its breach, not only by evidence
that is definite and clear, but that it must be beyond reasonable
doubt, and further that any judgment awarded the defendant
should be immediately effective.
Fastenau v. Engel:3 In April, 1948 plaintiff brought suit to
quiet title to land held by defendant under treasurer's deed issued
in September, 1943. Separate defenses of defendant were that
plaintiff's predecessors in title had abandoned the premises, failed
to pay taxes thereon, and that plaintiff was "barred by laches from
seeking relief in a court of equity." The Supreme Court held: that
no statute of limitations barred plaintiff's action; that failure to
pay taxes was not an abandonment of the property, nor did it con-
stitute laches, and this, even though the land had been enhanced in
value; and that courts will not invoke equitable defenses to destroy
legal rights where statutes of limitation are applicable.
Stubbs v. Standard Life Ass'n. :4 Action for reformation of
Mortgage Deed, the foreclosure proceedings thereof, and the Sher-
iff's Deed, to include as part of the property 290 acres that had been
omitted from the description through inadvertence. After issuance
of Sheriff's Deed the purchaser, holder of mortgage, went into pos-
session of omitted acreage and continued in possession for period
of more than ten years before there was any knowledge of the omis-
sion, and sixteen years before bringing action-paying taxes dur-
ing all of such time. No third parties or adverse rights had inter-
,1952-3 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. 11 (Sept. 27, 1952).
' 240 P. 2d 1173, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. 183 (Feb. 9, 1952).
" 242 P. 2d 819, 1951-2 C. B. A. Ady. Sh. 247 (March 22, 1952).
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vened. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial Court
awarding the plaintiff the relief prayed, and stated that the action
was properly maintainable under Rule 105, Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure.
Kerns v. Bank of Manitou :- Action instituted June 18, 1948
by purchaser for recission of contract to purchase real property on
basis of mutual mistake as to what tract was intended to be sold
and purchased. Tract conveyed by seller to purchaser by Quit
Claim Deed in September, 1946. In March, 1948 a survey disclosed
that tract conveyed was not the one intended to be sold and pur-
chased, and in April, 1948 purchaser notified seller that he elected
to rescind the contract and demanded return of consideration paid.
Between May 19, 1948 and August 10, 1948 purchaser negotiated
with third party for sale of tract (evidently the one that had been
conveyed), such third party being advised of this litigation and
that such proposed sale would have to be made with reference
thereto. Purchaser also paid the 1947 general taxes on August 3,
1948. The trial Court held that the purchaser by his acts had rati-
fied the Contract, and dismissed plaintiff's Complaint. The Supreme
Court reversed the trial Court, holding: that mistake as to what
tract was to be sold and purchased was a mutual mistake; that
plaintiff's conduct after he brought the suit was not an assertion
of ownership, he having specifically represented to prospective
buyer that the rescission suit was pending and that a sale could
not be consummated without consideration thereof, and the pro-
posed sale price was for the identical price he paid his seller; and
that it was plaintiff's duty to protect the land from tax sale so that
he would be in a position to reconvey the title to defendant should
his suit be successful and he be so ordered by the Court.
Smith v. Haertel:O Action to obtain a judgment decreeing
plaintiffs to be the owners of certain real property, free and clear
of any right, title or interest of the defendants, awarding plaintiffs
possession thereof, and for an accounting for rents and profits.
Defendants defended on basis that a Deed previously executed by
them was a mortgage. Supreme Court in affirming the judgment of
the lower Court in favor of the plaintiff stated: that for the purpose
of this case a mortgage may be defined as a conveyance of an estate
or interest in land by way of pledge as security for payment of a
debt, it becomes void upon payment in order to constitute a valid
mortgage, it is not necessary that the instrument itself should
contain a description of the debt, payment of which is intended
to be secured, nor is it essential that there be a note or other obli-
gation separate from the mortgage itself evidencing the indebted-
ness. However, it is necessary that there be a debt to be discharged,
such indebtedness must be recited in the mortgage, and the nature
and amount of the indebtedness secured by the mortgage must be
so expressed that subsequent purchasers and attaching creditors
need not look beyond the mortgage itself to ascertain both the ex-
A 242 P. 2d 817, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. 263 (March 29, 1952).
'244 P. 2d 377, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. 285 (April 12, 1952).
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istence and amount of the debt. It also must appear from the instru-
ment, or the circumstances present at the time of the transaction,
that the intention was that the property was to be held as security,
and further, the intent to create an equitable mortgage must be
clearly evidenced so that a prospective purchaser may be apprised
of the fact that the transactions between the parties to the instru-
ment have not been fully completed and all obligations thereunder
fully discharged.
WATER
The Brighton Ditch Co., et al. v. City of Engle wood:7 Action
instituted by City of Englewood to change point of diversion some
sixteen miles down stream of water rights acquired by it in con-
nection with its purchase of ranch property, with change of use of
the water from irrigation to domestic and municipal purposes.
The trial Court granted the change sought by plaintiff subject to
limitations and conditions imposed to protect the rights of other
appropriators, such limitations and conditions being so numerous
and technical in their nature that it is impossible for me to set
them forth. The Supreme Court affirmed the decree of the trial
Court on all points, thereby adhering to well defined rules con-
cerning protection of the water rights of others when a change is
granted, and holding that the evidence overwhelmingly justified the
finding of the trial Court that no vested rights would be injured by
the change.
City and County of Denver v. Noble :S Action against City for
alleged damages caused by it in construction and widening West
Alameda Avenue whereby plaintiff's irrigation ditch was damaged
and destroyed. Plaintiff recovered judgment against City for $9,000
in trial Court. Supreme Court reversed judgment on basis of incor-
rect and incomplete instructions given jury concerning the measure
of damages, giving its opinion as to proper measure under varying
circumstances.
The City of Colorado Springs v. Yust :" The City petitioned for
change of point of diversion of certain water rights from several
tributaries of the Blue River, decreed to the East Hoosier and West
Hoosier Ditches, alleging that such change would not injuriously
affect the vested rights of other appropriators. The defendants filed
protests, and after hearing the trial Court found that plaintiff had
failed to establish the fact that the proposed transfer and change
of point of diversion would not injuriously affect the vested rights
of others, and therefore denied the petition. The Supreme Court,
after reviewing the greater part of the evidence and the law per-
taining to such matters as previously laid down by the Supreme
Court to the effect that a water owner has an inherent right to
change the point of diversion without conditions, but with condi-
tions if such change can be made without substantial injury to the
- 237 P. 2d 116, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. 32 (Oct. 13, 1951).
6237 P. 2d 637, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. 44 (Oct..22, 1951).
01952-3 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. 10 (Sept. 27, 1952).
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vested rights of others, reversed the judgment of the trial Court
and remanded the case with directions to the trial Court to deter-
mine, upon the evidence already taken, together with any additional
evidence the parties may see fit to introduce, whether the change
of the point of diversion as prayed would injuriously affect the
vested rights of protestants, and, if so, whether such effect may be
prevented by the imposition of terms and conditions, and to enter
the Decree accordingly. The Supreme Court also stated that the
burden of proof on the petitioner in such a proceeding requires
him to meet only the grounds of injury to protestants asserted by
them, and that the evidence presented by the petitioner constituted
prima facie evidence to satisfy the burden of proof resting on the
petitioner.
OIL AND GAS
The only cases having to do with Oil and Gas are the cases
of Mitchell v. Espinosa 'o and Johnson v. McLaughlin,1 1 and cover
the manner of creating mineral reservations and the effect there-
of, and I believe have been reported upon by Mr. Rubright.
DAMAGES FOR SUBSIDENCE ACCOUNT REMOVAL OF COAL
Colorado Fuel and Iron Corporation v. Salardino :12 Action for
alleged damages to plaintiff's land and buildings caused by the
removal by the defendant, who owned the same, of coal deposits
underlying plaintiff's land and adjacent land in a careless, wrongful
and negligent manner. Defendant alleged that plaintiff's improve-
ments were placed upon the surface property with full knowledge
of defendant's right to mine and remove the coal adjacent to or
underlying the same, and by so doing plaintiff assumed the risk
of damage to his property. Plaintiff recovered judgment in the
trial Court. The Supreme Court, in reversing the case, and order-
ing a new trial, held that a mine operator must leave support suffi-
cient to maintain the surface in its natural state, but that negligence
on the part of the mine operator must be proved to recover for
damages to buildings erected upon the surface of the land.
REAL PROPERTY AND PROBATE
ROYAL C. RUBRIGHT
Mitchell v. Espinosa I is significant. A grantor reserved min-
eral rights in a deed. The mineral interest and the surface interest
were not thereafter separately assessed, but continued to be as-
sessed as a unit. A later Treasurer's Deed for unpaid taxes subse-
quent to the severance was held not to convey a tax title to the
mineral interest. This case was commented upon in DICTA.2 The
case also caused the Real Estate Title Standards Committee to pub-
10243 P. 2d 412, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. 243 (March 22, 1952).
243 P. 2d 812, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. 259 (March 22, 1952).
12 245 P. 2d 461, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. 367 (June 7, 1952).
'243 P. 2d 412, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. 243 (March 17, 1952).
"29 DICTA 225 (June, 1952).
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